comprehensible to the youth, and, if so, how should the officer modify such warnings?
The foundation supporting the American juvenile justice system is "rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in corpus juris." 2 In theory, the mission of the juvenile court is to ascertain the needs of the child while, at the same time, balancing the necessity for societal protection. Instead of acting as prosecutor and judge, the juvenile court officials take on the role of parens patriae. 3 This approach theoretically adds a more therapeutic-counseling atmosphere to juvenile hearings than does the more traditional adversarial environment of adult criminal trials. In fact, juvenile court officials possess greater discretion to use the law in numerous ways not generally available in other forums. As one commentator stated:
For them, law is not merely a code of conduct that children must be made to obey; it is a code whose violation is taken as symptomatic of an interior disorder and used to identify those children to be taken into custody and 'helped'. The discovery of a violation represents an opportunity to teach new lessons. 4 Acting as parens patriae, the juvenile court proceeds with a general program for the best interests of the youth while balancing the general interests of the community at large. In this respect, the child is not "considered an enemy of society but society's child who needs understanding, guidance and protection. The goals of the program are rehabilitation and protection from the social conditions that lead to crime." 5 Accordingly, the issues faced by the juvenile court are not criminal culpability, determinations of guilt or innocence, and punishment, but are instead sensitivity, understanding, guidance, and protection. 6 In the majority of cases, a law enforcement official refers the youth offender to the juvenile court. 7 Therefore, the youth's first contact with the juvenile justice system is achieved through some sort of interaction with the police (or juvenile) officer in the field. If the contact necessitates taking the youth into custody," the formal procedural requirements of the juvenile justice system are invoked. 9 Thus, from initial contact to formal invocation of juvenile procedure, the law enforcement official plays a vital role in the path the youth will take.
It is this "vital role" which mandates the extrapolation of the juvenile court's perceptions of "understanding, guidance, and protection" back to the moment of initial law enforcement intervention. Should the intervention necessitate taking the youth into custody, these perceptions should require at least the same procedural safeguards afforded persons in similar and parallel stages of adult investigation. As one commentator writes, "even greater protection might be required where juveniles are involved, since their immaturity and greater vulnerability place them at a greater disadvantage in their dealings with the police." 1 0
While it is arguable that some juveniles experienced in the "sys-8 Personal experience indicates that many police contacts merely end with a warning to the juvenile and transportation home to his or her parents or guardian without any formal or offical record made of the contact, other than a brief entry in the communications log and the officer's vehicle log. The field-officer may, however, write up an informal "field-interview card" about the contact and, after transporting the youth home, deliver the card to the department's juvenile division.
9 For example, in Atlantic City, when a juvenile is taken into custody following his alleged commission of a crime, the juvenile detective must immediately contact thejuvenile's parents or guardian. If contact is not immediately made, the officer must formally document the time and place of each contact attempt. The officer must also contact the Atlantic County Juvenile Intake Office, where on-call superior court staff personnel are informed of the circumstances of the instant case and thejuvenile's record and make a determination as to whether the child should be placed in ajuvenile detention center, a JINS (Juvenile in Need of Supervision) facility, or released into parental custody. If the Intake Office official determines that detention in a juvenile facility is warranted, the officer must execute a formal written request for detention and delineate the reasons for the detention therein. The officer then prepares a formal juvenile "petition," which is the charging instrument, and attaches to it the relevant custody and investigation reports. Next, he formally logs the time-in, time-out, and the destination location and, finally personally escorts the juvenile to one of the twenty-one available juvenile facilities. Interview withJames Kelly, Atlantic City PoliceJuvenile Detective, in Atlantic City, NewJersey (March 15, 1987) .
10 Grisso,Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 REV. , 1137 REV. (1980 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) , in which Justice Fortas in his discussion of juvenile admissions stated: "[T]he greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or dispair.") See also State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373 (Me. 1982) (in which Justice Carter of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated: "[C]ourts should never lose sight of the fact that ajuvenile's vulnerability and immaturity places him at a greater disadvantage than an adult when dealing with the police." Id. at 377).
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[Vol. 78 tem" have the ability to fend for themselves when questioned by a police official, most youths lack the proper faculties to comprehend the official inquiry or foresee the path down which it may lead." This problem of juvenile comprehension has been highlighted in empirical studies which focus on the ability of juveniles to understand and waive their Miranda rights.
12
Miranda 13 specifically discusses "the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial interrogation 14 and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself." 15 In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the five-member majority, established "concrete consitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 16 The majority fashioned the guidelines into specific procedural requirements which must be adhered to before any statements made by an individual during custodial interrogation may be used against him.
[U]nless other fully effective means are devised to inform persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, pro-11 A question naturally arises as to whether the majority of adult laymen have the ability to stand on equal footing with a questioning law enforcement official. A 1967 Yale study of draft protesters indicated that even highly intelligent, well-educated, and extremely willful suspects-twenty-one Yale faculty and staff members and studentswho were advised of their rights by FBI agents in their own homes or offices failed to understand the nature and function of the constitutional rights at stake and could not "turn off" their "interviewers" even when they indicated that they did not want to be questioned. Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967) . Accord Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968) . See also infra note 41 and accompanying text.
12 See Grisso, supra note 10, at 1134 (arguing that doubts surrounding a youth's ability to comprehend the Miranda warnings are fortified "by the fact that despite receiving the warnings, most juveniles in pretrial proceedings waive rather than invoke their rights"); Grisso & Pomicter, In its discussion of the fifth amendment, the Court "readily perceive [s] an intimate connection between the privilege against selfincrimination and police custodial questioning" 20 and concludes that "the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." 2 1 Accordingly, the privilege was held to be fully applicable during periods of police custodial interrogation. Gault, 24 in which Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority, determined that "the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults." ' 2 5 Although the Court briefly mentioned Miranda in this juvenile adjudicatory setting, 26 the question necessarily arises whether such a reference is misplaced. The Court specifically limited its holding to adjudicatory proceedings before a juvenile court. 27 Furthermore, there was no admission on the record elicited by police custodial interrogation. Rather, the admissions at issue were elicited and relied upon by the juvenile court itself. 28 Nonetheless, Justice Fortas stated:
[Tjhe privilege against self-incrimination is, of course related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth .... It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children.
29
As a result, Gault may, on the one hand, be interpreted as delivering no constitutional precedent on the applicability of Miranda to pre-adjudicatory police-juvenile custodial interrogation. On the other hand, the citation to Miranda in reference to the juvenile court may have been purposely included; it may very well be a harbinger to the lower courts suggesting one of the factors to be considered when a court is determining whether a juvenile's admissions which resulted from custodial police interrogation should be admitted in a delinquency proceeding with the consequence that the youth may be committed to a correctional institution. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) Id. at 13, 22 n.30 ("We consider only the problems presented by this case. These relate to proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a delinquent as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution." Id. at 13.).
28 Here, the Court observed that while no alleged admissions made by the defendant to the probation officer appeared in the record, that record did contain admissions made by him to the juvenile courtjudge. As a result, the Although the court found it unnecessary to decide this issue due to the arresting officer's administration of all the Miranda requirements, 32 its use of the word "extend" suggests the conclusion that to so hold would require extrapolation of the Gault Court's application of the fifth amendment privilege back to the moment of police custodial interrogation.
33
Conversely, many jurisdictions do not approach the issue as requiring an "extension" of Gault, but construe Gault as mandating the administration of the Miranda warnings in pre-adjudicatory juvenile settings through rationales which impel the inescapable conclusion ... that Gault requires that in a hearing to determine whether a juvenile has committed an offense for which he may be confined in a correctional institution, admissions made by the juvenile during in-custody questioning may not be introduced in evidence unless it is first shown that the Miranda warnings were given, and the privilege against self-incrimination was intelligently waived.
34
With similar reasoning, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Leach v. State, 3 5 interpreted Gault as requiring appellate courts to "regard appeals in juvenile cases more strictly in a case where delinquency proceedings may lead to commitment in a state institution." ' 36 In Leach, a probation officer interrogated a twelve-year-old girl without an attorney present and without the administration of the Miranda warnings. Although a question arose whether this juvenile could understand the warnings even if given, the court nonethe-30 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969).
31 Id. at 468. 32 Id. at 468 n.6. The court,.in a narrow holding, decided only that ajuvenile's confession obtained outside the presence of his or her parents is not per se inadmissible. Rather, a juvenile's waiver of his Miranda rights will be assessed by the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether it was truly voluntary and intelligent. Id. at 469.
33 Cf Comment,Juvenile Miranda Waiver, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 704, 710 (1975) (interpreting Gault as providing no constitutional basis for procedures or rights applicable to prejudicial stages of the juvenile process).
34 In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49-51 (D.C. 1968)(presenting a situation in which the investigating police detective failed to administer the Miranda warnings prior to engaging in custodial interrogation of the juvenile suspect. The court reasoned that " [s] ince Gaul! makes the Miranda rules applicable to the Juvenile Court, and appellant's Miranda rights were clearly violated here, the judgment of the Juvenile Court must be reversed."). Other jurisdictions focus on thejuvenile's age, education, intelligence, and experience to determine whether the juvenile's admissions were truly voluntary. In State v. R. W., 3 8 the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court was presented with an appeal challenging the adjudication of delinquency of twelve-year-old R.W. for possession of stolen property. The public defender asserted that the confession relied upon by the juvenile court was improperly admitted because the police detective failed to administer all the Miranda warnings by not advising the youth of his right to a court appointed attorney if he were an indigent. Holding the confession admissible on a due process and fundamental fairness standard, 39 the court pointed out that, even if each of the Miranda warnings had been perfectly administered, "this boy did not have the age, mentality, schooling (he was in the third grade) or experience to understand them well enough to knowingly and intelligently choose whether or not to talk or ask for a lawyer." 40 Judge Gaulkin further noted:
Juvenile courts deal with children as young as eight. Children of tender years may understand each word of the Miranda warnings when plainly and clearly given; they may have street or movie knowledge about the right to keep silent and to demand a 'mouthpiece,' but nevertheless, up to a certain age they cannot be deemed to be able to waive the Miranda privileges. 4 '
37 Id. at 821. Also contributing to the court's decision to reverse was the fact that the probation officer made no attempt to provide the juvenile with counsel to safeguard her rights. 44 In S.H., a juvenile delinquency complaint charged that ten-year-old S.H. caused the drowning death of his six-year-old playmate by pushing him into a canal. When S.H. was brought to the police station, his father was already there. Before the police officials conducted any questioning of S.H., however, they sent Mr. H. home. Then, after reading and fully explaining the Miranda warnings, the officers procompared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of consequences of his admissions); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948)(noting that a child is an easy victim of the law and cannot be judged by more exacting standards of maturity). Cf. Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (the Court, in a case involving a child's right to an abortion, explained that "immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take into account both immediate and long-range consequences."). This author believes, however, that, as the age of the youth approaches majority, the juvenile-adult distinction for purposes of Miranda become nothing but a legal fiction. In over eight years of police investigations, this author encountered few adults who truly comprehended the nature and significance of their rights. Many demanded the rights as they were accustomed to hearing on television, but few truly listened. This observation has been confirmed by Temple University Professor Marina Angel and Northfield Defense Attorney and former police legal advisor D. William Subin, who both question whether the majority of adult laymen have the sufficient faculties to make an informed and intelligent decision to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. As Judge Gaulkin explained in R. TV., choosing to waive the privilege necessarily involves "an understanding of the charge, the possible defenses, the nature of the evidence against the defendant and how it was obtained, the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, etc., which only those trained in crime or law possess. In addition to holding the confession invalid due to the coercive tactics, Justice Proctor, speaking for a unanimous court, observed generally that the administration of Miranda warnings to a ten-yearold "even when they are explained is undoubtedly meaningless. Such a boy certainly lacks the capability to fully understand the meaning of his rights. Thus, he cannot make a knowing and intelligent waiver of something he cannot understand." 4 5
As a result, when R. W. and S.H. are considered as a unit, law enforcement officials are instructed that, "if the child is not old enough to understand and waive, and the parents cannot be found or cannot or will not attend," 4 6 "... the questioning may go forward, even if it is obvious the [child] does not understand his rights if the questioning is conducted with the utmost fairness and in accordance with the highest standards of due process and fundamental fairness." '4 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court, nevertheless, did caution the police officials in S.H. that sending Mr. H. away prior to their questioning of the boy, coupled with their ninety minute custodial interrogation, represented an offensive practice that would not be tolerated in the future.
8
State in Interest of J.P.B. 49 presents a set of circumstances in which a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based upon a confession obtained without administration of the Miranda warnings. The offense was of such a degree that it is likely that the juvenile would have been committed to a correctional institution. This juvenile, in contrast to ten-year-old S.H. or twelve-year-old R.W., was over seventeen years old. Additionally, the confession inJ.P.B., as in S.H., was the product of seemingly coercive custodial interrogation. 50 TV, that "[u] nless the case clearly appears to be one which will be transferred to the criminal courts, we do not think counsel must be assigned at this point simply because the parents cannot be present, although it is always desirable to have counsel present if one is readily available." 115 N.J. Super. at 296, 279 A.2d at 714. 48 S.H., 61 NJ. at 115, 143 N.J. Super. 96, 362 A.2d 1183 Super. 96, 362 A.2d (1976 . 50 J.P.B. was committed to the Highfields Residential Group Center which is a state institution to which juveniles are committed as a condition of probation upon an adjudication of delinquency. As part of the program, he was required to participate in discussions with state staff personnel. Participants are encouraged to "bare their souls," that is, to reveal all prior antisocial activity, including criminal acts. It is understood that a a result, the court held "on Miranda grounds" that the confession obtained "was not properly admissible in his trial for juvenile delinquency.-5 1 Therefore, the test in New Jersey to determine the admissibility of a juvenile confession is "due process and fundamental fairness." 52 The administration of Miranda warnings is strongly advised, but an absence of these warnings will not automatically and mechanically exclude admissions or confessions obtained. Administration of the warnings, however, remains an important element in the totality-of-the-circumstances determination of whether an admission is truly voluntary, 53 not only in the sense that it is not a product of police overreaching, 54 but also in the sense that any waiver of Miranda is truly a voluntary and intelligent relinquishment of a known constitutional right. Moreover, as the age of the juvenile offender approaches majority, 5 5 and his intelligence, level of education, and experiences increase, 5 6 failure to administer the Miranda warnings coupled with the slightest hint of official coercion will most likely cause any admissions to be excluded from a delinquency proceeding which could result in the juvenile being committed to a correctional institution.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Legislatures of numerous jurisdictions have responded to Mifailure to participate results in undesirable sanctions. The confession at issue derived from one of these "group" sessions which was devoted entirely to J.P.B. The court determined that the session constituted "custodial interrogation" conducted by 53 See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)(in which the Court delineated the following factors relevant to the determination of whether a juvenile has waived his or her rights: (1) age; (2) level of education; (3) knowledge as to the substance of the charge, if any has been filed; (4) whether he or she was given Miranda warnings; (5) whether he or she was held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends, or an attorney; (6) whether the questioning occurred before or after the initiation of formal charges; and (7) the methods used in, and length of, the interrogation. (a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning:
(1) That he has the right to remain silent; and (2) That any statement he does make can be and may be used against him; and (3) That he has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning; 64 and (4) That he has a right to consult with an attorney and that one will be appointed for him if he is not represented and wants representation. -595 (1979) . This section has been construed as prescribing mandatory procedures which must be followed prior to any questioning. The failure of law enforcement officials to comply with its provisions results in the inadmissibility of any statement so obtained. In re Riley, 61 N.C. App. 749, 301 S.E.2d 750 (1983) . P., 198 N.J. Super. 105, 108, 486 A.2d 873, 876 (App. Div. 1984). be administered by law enforcement officers prior to any questioning of juveniles in custody, 6 6 a question necessarily arises whether the officer must modify those warnings to make their administration comprehensible to the youth.
In 1969, the California Supreme Court in In re Dennis M. 67 mixed the rationales of Miranda and In re Gault to conclude that juvenile admissions may not be admitted into evidence unless the prosecution meets its burden of establishing at trial that full and complete Miranda warnings were given. 6 8 Justice Mosk, speaking for the court, was adamant about the necessity of the warnings and further stated that "a police officer's conclusory testimony that he gave the questionee advice 'per accordance with the Miranda decision' is inadequate to discharge such burden." 6 9 Rather, the requirement of "full and complete warnings" 70 in the context ofjuvenile interrogation means not only that the law enforcement officer advise the youth of the full panoply of rights as delineated in Miranda, but also that those rights must be given in terms the youth can comprehend. Accordingly, Justice Mosk provided California peace officers with the following recommendation:
To avoid future conflicts on this issue, we recommend that juvenile officers and police be prepared to give their compulsory Miranda warnings in terms that reflect the language and experience of today's juveniles. 7 See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (in which the Supreme Court "assumed without deciding that the Miranda warnings apply to pre-adjudicatory custodial interrogation of minors in order to decide whether the warnings given by the officials were voluntarily and knowingly waived by a sixteen-and-a-half-year-oldjuvenile prior to his questioning concerning the circumstances surrounding a Van Nuys, California murder.").
67 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
68 Id. at 462, 450 P.2d at 306, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (construing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
69 Id. When the trial court asked the officer to paraphrase from memory the warnings given, it became apparent that the officer failed to mention the required warning that anything the youth said could and would be used against him in court. Id. at 462, 450 P.2d at 306, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
70 The "full and complete" requirement was held fulfilled due not only to the fact that a deputy district attorney supplemented the officer's Miranda administration, but particularly because the youth's attorney failed to pose a timely and appropriate objection to the officer's testimony at trial. Id.
71 Id. at 480 n.13, 450 P.2d at 308 n.13, 75 Cal. Rptr. at n.13. At § 2.247 of the Report, entitled "Procedures Applicable to the Interrogation of Juveniles," 75 the National Advisory Committee recommends not only that Miranda warnings be administered to juveniles in custody, but also that officials not question such juveniles, nor accept any formal oral or written statements, unless the full panoply of Miranda warnings have been administered and "explained in language understandable by the juvenile, '7 6 taking into account his or her intellect and maturity.
In 1982, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in State v. Nicholas S. 77 reversed a district court's 78 denial of ajuvenile's motion to suppress his confession due to the inadequate administration of the Miranda warnings by the investigating officers. Although the testimony indicated that one officer read the fourteen-year-old the warnings from the standard Miranda card while the other officer attempted to elaborate upon them, when the juvenile court judge asked the officer to specify the extent of the elaboration, the officer was unable to recall the words used, "beyond the conclusory statement that [he] did elaborate upon the standard Miranda reading." '7 9 The Supreme Judicial Court admonished the officers' actions, stating:
Law enforcement officials would be well advised to fully explain the rights enunciated in the Miranda warning when dealing with juvenile offenders in order to assure adequate comprehension of these important safeguards.
8 0 terms, and included individuals with special knowledge of delinquency prevention and treatment, the administration ofjuvenile justice, school violence, vandalism, or learning disabilities, as well as representatives of private voluntary organizations and community based programs." Id. at ix. 73 The Report, as a reflection of the basic principles and policies of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, see infra note 73, offers specific strategies, criteria and approaches that can be used in accomplishing some of the important objectives of the Act.
74 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1978 Id. The court held the confession inadmissible and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings in which the confession would be excluded. The factors which entered into the court's finding of an invalid waiver included: (I) the absence in the record indicating how the officers elaborated upon the formal Miranda warnings; (2) the failure of the officers to give the "fifth" Afiranda warning, that is, to inform the accused of his or her right to terminate questioning at any time; (3) the failure to readminister the Mfiranda warnings when the interrogation was resumed following a long interruption; (4) the fact that the officers focused their remarks to thejuvenile's mother who, in turn, told the juvenile to "tell the police the truth"; (5) In light of the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that depending on the specific jurisdiction, appellate resolution of the introductory hypothetical could be decided either way. If the officer advised S.D. of his Miranda rights and included an explanation of each in terms the youth could comprehend, the confession would, given the other findings of the juvenile court judge, undoubtedly be admissible in all jurisdictions. 8 5 Moreover, if the officer had access to, and utilized, a carefully constructed "Youth Rights Form" which set forth the Miranda warnings with accompanying simplified explanations, his testimony naturally would be bolstered by this corroborating piece of documentary evidence. Without such a form, the officer is left with the standard adult Miranda exposition and any creativity he can muster at the time if creative at the time he so feels.
education; and (6) Little information, however, is available on the efficacy of administering a simplified set of Miranda warnings to juveniles. One study indicates that younger or less experienced youths respond favorably to a simplified Miranda form. 93 This study concludes that the great majority of juveniles "should be advised and counseled 86 Benoit, 126 N.H. at 18, 490 A.2d at 304. 87 Grisso, supra note 10. The method employed by Grisso required the development of "objective, reliable methods for measuring comprehension." Id. at 1143. The methods encompassed the measurement of two indicia of comprehension: first, whether the youth understands the words and phrases employed in the standard Miranda form, and second, whether he or she accurately perceives the function and significance of the rights conveyed in the warnings. Id. To facilitate the methods, two tests were administered: a "Vocab Test," which tested the research subjects' comprehension of words in the formal Miranda warning, such as "consult," "attorney," "interrogation,' ' "appoint," "entitled," and "right"; and a "Rights Test," consisting of a questionnaire which asked the research subject to paraphrase each Miranda warning. The responses were then assigned to a particular scoring criterion, and the results were correlated. In 1985, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire offered a more comprehensive form for New Hampshire juvenile officers and police. 9 7 Its effectiveness, however, remains to be seen. More importantly, the court declared that the failure to use the simplified form results in a presumption of inadequate explanation of the juvenile's rights. 9 8 B.
METHODOLOGY As a preliminary step, a simplified version of the Miranda warnings was constructed using each formal warning followed by a simplified version or explanation of the formal warning. This version was constructed by synthesizing the model used by the Benoit The resulting version was then tested by interviewing twentyfive juveniles taken into custody for various offenses at the Atlantic City Police Department's Juvenile Bureau. The responses and experiences gained from the initial interviews formed the basis for further modification of the Youth Rights Form. 101 Each youth was first read the formal Miranda warnings and asked whether he or she understood the warnings. If the answer was no, the youth was then read the modified form. Nine of the juveniles interviewed responded by saying they did not fully understand the formal warning. After being read their rights from the modified form, all nine responded by saying that they now understand. If the answer was yes, the youth was asked to explain what each warning meant. The varying responses aided in the further revision of the Youth Rights Form. Of the sixteen youths who responded by saying presented to a juvenile court judge of the New Jersey Superior Court, Family Division, 102 and, after consultation, was modified further.
The next step involved sending the Youth Rights Form to twenty law-enforcement agencies across the United States requesting that officials who have day-to-day contacts with juvenile offenders insert their comments, changes, and modifications for further revision and refinement of each warning. The comments, changes, and modifications received reflected the collective personal experiences of professional law enforcement officials presently active in the field of juvenile justice. Moreover, many of the responses included insertions depicting simplified Miranda warning explanations the particular responding official had found to be most effective. The final step involved the synthesis of all the recommendations received into a comprehensive, readily understandable document: The Youth Rights Form. 10 3 that they understood the formal warnings, only three were able to fully explain the significance of each warning.
Before any of the juveniles were read the modifed version, each was asked, after the reading of the standard adult Miranda form, whether they thought they must speak to the police. Seven of the juveniles felt that speaking to the police was mandatory, believing that a failure to do so would result in some sort of punishment; three felt that it was a gcod idea, believing that speaking would expedite their release; five gave equivocal responses; and ten indicated that they knew that they did not have to speak to the police. After reading the modified form, only three of the youths still believed that speaking to the police was required-two who originally thought speaking was mandatory to avoid punishment, and one who originally thought that speaking to the police would expedite his release.
102 Judge Steven Perskie of the New Jersey Superior Court, Family Division, who, in an average week, will hear approximatley 50 juvenile delinquency proceedings. [Check]
APPENDIX YOUTH RIGHTS FORM
[The following must be read and explained by the officer, and, the youth (and parent, guardian, or custodian) shall read it before signing.] Before I am allowed to ask you any questions, you must understand that you have certain important rights, or protections, that have been given to you by our laws in these situations. These rights will make sure that you will be treated fairly. You will not be punished for deciding to use these rights. I will read these rights to you, and explain each of them to you if you don't understand them, or think you may not understand them. You may ask questions as we go along so that you can completely understand what your rights are. 
